In February 2017, Carlos Ghosn announced he would step down as Nissan’s chief executive (a position he’d held since 2001) and hand over the CEO role to Hiroto Saikawa as of April 1, 2017[1]. Ghosn, then 62, retained his post as Nissan’s Chairman and also remained Chairman/CEO of the Renault Nissan Mitsubishi Alliance[2]. This move was explicitly intended to let Ghosn focus on strategic alliance cooperation, he stated that as Nissan’s chairman he would “continue to supervise and guide the company… within the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi [Alliance],” pledging support for the alliance as it “evolves and expands”[2]. Ghosn had recently also become Chairman of Mitsubishi Motors (after Nissan’s investment in Mitsubishi), and he indicated that relinquishing Nissan’s CEO duties would free him to concentrate on improving Renault’s performance and ensuring the Alliance’s long-term integration[3]. Saikawa, a 40-year Nissan veteran, took over day-to-day management as Nissan’s new CEO on April 1, 2017[1], while Ghosn oversaw higher-level alliance strategy as Chairman, a leadership shuffle aimed at solidifying the partnership among Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi.

Ghosn’s Alliance Vision, Separate Identities with Shared Development & Cost Synergy

Carlos Ghosn’s vision for the Alliance stressed that each automaker should preserve its distinct corporate identity and brand culture, even as they pool expertise and resources. Under Ghosn, the Alliance explicitly was “not a merger” of the companies but a strategic partnership, each firm kept its own board, management, and brand, while joining forces in areas of mutual benefit[4]. Ghosn compared the alliance to a marriage: partners “retain their own individuality… united by shared interests and goals” rather than converging into a single identity[5]. The goal was to leverage economies of scale and collective innovation without one company subsuming the other[6][7]. Concretely, Ghosn championed joint development of technologies, common vehicle architectures, and combined purchasing to reduce costs, all done in a way that “ensures the preservation and clear distinctiveness of [each company’s] brand and product identities, while at the same time providing a highly competitive cost structure”[8]. Non-brand-critical components would be standardized across Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi to save money, whereas brand-specific elements remain separate to maintain uniqueness[8]. This approach allowed the Alliance to share engineering and manufacturing efforts to eliminate redundancy and achieve large cost synergies (targeting €10 billion in annual savings by 2022)[9], all while “each company acts in the financial interest of the other, while maintaining individual brand identities”[10]. Ghosn consistently rejected a full-blown merger, arguing that past automotive mergers failed to deliver benefits and that an alliance with trust and autonomy was more effective[7]. By preserving Renault’s, Nissan’s and Mitsubishi’s independence, yet forcing cooperation on investments and innovations, Ghosn’s model aimed to get the “best of both worlds”: shared expertise and scale economies without destroying the unique brands and cultures that drove each company’s success[8][9].

Trust Crisis, French State Intervention, and Ghosn’s Continued Leadership

A major trust crisis in the Alliance erupted in 2015, when the French government (Renault’s largest shareholder) suddenly raised its stake in Renault to secure double voting rights, alarming Nissan. Nissan feared this move gave France undue control over Nissan via Renault[17][18]. The dispute, sometimes called the “Florange Law” or double-vote saga, deeply strained Renault-Nissan relations, with Nissan’s management even threatening to unwind parts of the Alliance if a resolution wasn’t reached[19]. Carlos Ghosn was caught between Renault’s state shareholders and Nissan’s independence concerns. Ultimately, a December 2015 compromise defused the clash: France agreed to cap its votes on non-strategic matters, and Renault formally pledged not to interfere in Nissan’s governance without Nissan’s consent[20][21]. Nissan, in return, dropped demands to fundamentally re-balance the two companies’ cross-shareholdings (which would have reduced Renault’s stake)[20][21]. This truce, brokered by Ghosn, restored a fragile trust, and underscored how vital Ghosn’s leadership was to keeping the Alliance together. In the wake of that episode, both the French state and Renault’s board became convinced that Ghosn’s continued presence was essential to “secure the Alliance” and reassure Nissan. Indeed, by early 2018 the French government (now under President Emmanuel Macron, who as economy minister had instigated the 2015 voting rights fight) reversed its stance and backed Ghosn’s renewal as Renault CEO[22]. Bruno Le Maire, Finance Minister, emphasized the state’s “extreme vigilance” over the Alliance’s stability and supported retaining Ghosn to strengthen Renault-Nissan ties for the long term[23][24]. Ghosn was expected to relinquish executive control to a successor around 2018, but plans changed after the trust crisis, Renault’s board formally asked Ghosn to stay on for another term (2018–2022) specifically to fortify the Alliance’s future[25][26]. Ghosn agreed, on the condition that he be empowered to craft and lead a strategy that would cement an “irreversible” Alliance structure going forward[25][22]. In practice this meant Ghosn would devote much of his new term to aligning Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi on a common vision, with the French state’s blessing. Notably, all parties tacitly acknowledged that a delicate balance must be struck: the French government vowed not to repeat its 2015 power play, and Ghosn obtained a mandate to guide Alliance strategy autonomously, as a sort of supra-CEO across the three companies[27][28]. This arrangement, keeping Ghosn in charge of Renault while also leading the Alliance, was seen as the best guarantee of stability at a time when mutual trust was fragile. In summary, the 2015 double-voting rights clash created a crisis of confidence between Renault and Nissan. To repair it, Renault (backed by France) deferred to Ghosn’s leadership, insisting he remain at the helm to uphold the alliance’s unity; Ghosn in turn leveraged this support to insist on guiding Alliance integration strategy on his terms[25][24].

No Full Merger, No Reduction of Renault’s Stake, Ghosn’s Cooperative Model

Throughout his tenure, Carlos Ghosn resisted calls for an outright merger between Renault and Nissan, and likewise rejected proposals to significantly alter the cross-shareholding equity stakes (which give Renault a 43.4% controlling stake in Nissan, and Nissan a 15% non-voting stake in Renault). Both ideas had been floated repeatedly, some investors urged a conventional merger to “unlock” value, while Nissan’s executives at times wanted Renault’s stake cut to gain more autonomy[29][30]. Ghosn chose a middle path: the Alliance under Ghosn remained a partnership structure, not a single fused entity, and Renault’s share in Nissan was kept stable. During the 2015 crisis, for example, Nissan privately proposed acquiring more Renault shares to equalize holdings, but in the final agreement Ghosn did not concede any reduction in Renault’s stake[31][21]. Instead, he granted Nissan formal governance safeguards (assurances Renault wouldn’t dominate Nissan’s board or strategy) to address Nissan’s concerns while preserving the existing equity structure[21]. Ghosn firmly believed that a full merger or a major stake rebalancing could upset the Alliance’s successful formula. He argued that forcing a single corporate entity would create culture clashes and “destroy what had been delivering results” for both firms[7]. “It’s not validated by any example in the car industry that [a full merger] works. Not one example,” Ghosn told Reuters in 2011, calling the idea of simply combining companies top-down “rubbish”[7]. Likewise, he felt Renault’s sizable holding in Nissan was a source of stability (aligning their financial interests) and should not be arbitrarily unwound. Instead of a merger, Ghosn favored deepening cooperation through formal Alliance agreements. In his own words, “the Alliance is a strategic partnership, not a merger or acquisition”, each company would remain independent in identity, but “join to build a life together, united by shared interests”[5]. Under Ghosn’s model, common Alliance institutions (like joint purchasing, R&D, and the Amsterdam-based Renault-Nissan BV coordination company) were strengthened to bind the companies, but Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi continued to operate as distinct corporations[10][6]. Ghosn repeatedly emphasized that this approach protected each firm’s national interests and brand heritage, which he saw as crucial for employee and stakeholder acceptance[4][32]. For example, when asked about balancing synergy and identity, Ghosn explained that because the Alliance was “not a merger…you’re keeping each company with its own executive committee, its own board…its own shareholders”, so “you don’t have to worry about identity” being lost[4]. What needed attention, in Ghosn’s view, was making sure the companies worked together effectively for synergies; a merger, by contrast, would create winners and losers and threaten that cooperation[32]. He saw the Alliance’s “separate companies, shared goals” structure as a competitive advantage, enabling, for instance, platform-sharing and joint innovation (electric cars, autonomous tech, etc.) without provoking political concerns about a French or Japanese takeover. In short, Ghosn did not endorse a full Renault-Nissan corporate merger, nor did he voluntarily dilute Renault’s equity stake in Nissan; instead he championed a novel alliance model that preserved each company’s autonomy and identity while institutionalizing ever-closer collaboration on product development, technology, and costs[4][8]. This philosophy guided the Alliance to record combined sales and profits by late 2010s without a formal merger, a structure Ghosn defended as vital to its success.

2018, Renewal Contingent on Alliance Strategy Endorsement by All Three Companies

When Ghosn was approached in early 2018 to extend his leadership, he tied his acceptance to an understanding that all three Alliance partners (Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi) would endorse his strategic vision for the Alliance’s future. By this point, Ghosn’s priority was to solidify an Alliance framework that would endure beyond his tenure, often described as making the partnership “irreversible.” He made clear that any significant changes to the Renault-Nissan capital or governance structure must have buy-in from all stakeholders, including the boards of Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi, as well as government authorities in France and Japan[33]. In February 2018, Renault’s board did vote to reappoint Ghosn as CEO for another four years, explicitly charging him with strengthening Alliance integration. The board’s resolution instructed Ghosn to “take decisive steps to make the alliance irreversible” in his next term, reflecting consensus that a more permanent Alliance arrangement was needed before he eventually stepped down[25][28]. Ghosn agreed to stay on and undertake this mission, but he sought commitments from the Japanese side as well. He indicated that by 2018 he would develop an Alliance “road map” or structural plan, and he wanted the boards of Nissan and Mitsubishi to formally approve this plan alongside Renault’s board, effectively aligning all three companies behind a common strategy for their partnership. According to Bloomberg, Ghosn said the companies would work out a plan to “make the alliance irreversible” during his new term, and any deeper integration (such as a possible holding-company structure) would require approval from both companies’ boards and both governments before proceeding[34][33]. In practice, over mid-2018 Ghosn convened discussions on how to reconfigure the Alliance’s governance, with ideas ranging from a looser holding company to a full merger being explored[35][36]. He reportedly insisted that no decision would be made unilaterally: any final proposal would be presented to and voted on by the boards of Renault, Nissan and Mitsubishi. This condition ensured that Nissan and Mitsubishi, who had their own concerns and agendas, were on record supporting whatever “irreversible” alliance structure Ghosn crafted. Indeed, Nissan’s leadership was informed and involved in these talks; later investigations found that some at Nissan grew “alarmed by Ghosn’s pledge in early 2018 to make the alliance irreversible,” interpreting it as a step toward deeper consolidation, which contributed to internal tensions[37]. Nevertheless, up until his November 2018 arrest, Ghosn was working under the mandate that his continued role as Alliance leader was predicated on achieving a strategic plan approved by all three firms’ boards. In essence, Ghosn’s extension was not a blank check, it came with the understanding that he would deliver a mutually agreeable Alliance blueprint. He even noted that any change in the Alliance’s capital structure would need the assent of both the French and Japanese governments, underscoring how consensus-based the process had to be[33]. This multilateral commitment reflected Ghosn’s effort to bind the companies into a unified vision: if Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi all formally signed onto the Alliance’s next phase, it would greatly reduce the chance of fragmentation after Ghosn’s departure. Thus, Ghosn’s acceptance of a new term as Renault/Alliance chief executive in 2018 came hand-in-hand with securing board-level approval across Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi for his Alliance consolidation plan, to ensure that the path he charted had collective endorsement and would survive him[34][25].

February 15, 2018, Renault Board Sets Ghosn’s New Mandate: Strategy, Alliance, Succession (No Merger)

On February 15, 2018, Renault’s board of directors met in Boulogne-Billancourt and officially approved renewing Carlos Ghosn’s term as CEO for four more years[38][39]. In doing so, the board, with French government support, laid out three key objectives for Ghosn’s new mandate, which were disclosed in the board’s communiqué and subsequent press coverage. First, Ghosn was tasked to “pilot the strategic challenges of the ‘Drive the Future’ plan”[40], this refers to Renault’s mid-term strategic plan (Drive the Future 2017–2022) which aimed to grow revenues to €70 billion by 2022 (from ~€50 billion in 2016) and introduced new models and technologies. The board wanted Ghosn to ensure the successful execution of this plan’s initiatives and financial targets[40]. Second, the board charged Ghosn with “engaging the decisive steps to make the Alliance sustainable (pérenne)”[41]. In plain terms, Renault’s directors were directing Ghosn to solidify the Renault–Nissan–Mitsubishi Alliance’s structure so that it would endure long-term, essentially the “irreversibility” mandate discussed above. This reflected the priority of securing an Alliance framework that could survive leadership changes and national tensions. Notably, the board’s language focused on sustainability and balance in the Alliance rather than any legal merger. In fact, the board did not instruct Ghosn to pursue a full merger; instead, it implied that maintaining a stable alliance (without upsetting the “complex balances between French and Japanese interests”) was the goal[41]. Contemporary reports highlighted that the alliance’s structure “today rests largely on [Ghosn’s] personal authority” and thus needed formalizing to be resilient[42]. Third, Renault’s board, prodded by the French state, insisted that Ghosn prepare his own succession and bolster Renault’s management team[38][43]. In line with this, at the same meeting Ghosn announced the appointment of Thierry Bolloré as Deputy CEO (chief operating officer), effective Feb. 19, 2018[43]. Bolloré, a French executive with international experience, was clearly being positioned as a potential heir. The French government had long urged Renault to name a clear “number two” to ensure continuity post-Ghosn[44], and the board’s actions fulfilled that by installing Bolloré. Additionally, Ghosn agreed to a 30% reduction in his own compensation at the state’s behest, which the board noted, this concession helped secure shareholder and government support for his renewal[45]. Together, these steps addressed governance concerns and the future leadership pipeline. Crucially, pursuing a merger was not one of the board’s stated objectives in Ghosn’s renewed mandate. On the contrary, French officials and the Renault board signaled that any alliance restructuring must safeguard each company’s interests. President Macron publicly sought a “clear road map” for the Alliance that protected French jobs and influence, implying that an outright merger (which could diminish French influence given Nissan’s size) was not assumed[23][33]. Ghosn himself cautioned at that time that further integration (e.g. a merger or unified holding company) would only be possible if both French and Japanese governments approved, and he doubted the Japanese side would agree so long as France remained a shareholder[33]. In essence, Renault’s Feb 2018 board resolutions gave Ghosn a green light to strengthen the alliance without mandating any specific merger. The priority was an “irreversible” alliance successor structure, not necessarily a single fused entity. By February 15, 2018, Ghosn had the Renault board’s explicit backing to carry out these objectives[46][41]: drive Renault’s strategic growth, ensure the Alliance’s long-term viability, and put in place a succession plan, all while keeping the Alliance’s balance intact. On the very next day (Feb 16, 2018), Renault announced these decisions publicly and shareholders were informed that Ghosn’s renewal (and the accompanying alliance strategy and governance measures) would be put to a vote at the June 2018 annual meeting[38]. The French state, holding 15% of Renault, expressed satisfaction that Ghosn accepted these conditions, and indeed voted in favor of his pay and reappointment after he met their demands (a notable shift after years of government opposition to his pay)[45]. In summary, on Feb. 15, 2018 Renault’s board unanimously re-appointed Ghosn with a clear mandate: execute the company’s strategic plan, secure the Alliance’s future (without necessarily merging companies), and groom a successor to take over when the time came[46][43]. These objectives were set in light of the Alliance’s recent successes and challenges, and were aimed at ensuring that the world’s then-largest automotive alliance would continue to thrive beyond Ghosn’s eventual departure.

Martin Vial’s April 2018 Meeting in Japan

In April 2018, Martin Vial, head of France’s state shareholding agency (APE) and a Renault board member, visited Japan and met with Nissan executives including Hari Nada. In April 23, 2018 meeting, Nada’s report notes that Nissan preferred maintaining the status quo alliance but would consider a “re-balancing of the shareholding” (i.e. Renault reducing its stake and Nissan increasing its stake) so neither side could dominate[47]. Vial responded that such rebalancing would be “a too big a sacrifice for Renault” unless it was accompanied by a major step toward a full merger[48]. This indicates that any move to equalize stakes (giving Nissan more influence) had to go hand-in-hand with progress toward an outright merger, and underscores that Japanese officials (METI) were directly liaising with Vial during this period to discuss the alliance’s future[47][48].

May 2018 METI Intervention and MoU

On May 7, 2018, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), at the director-general level, held direct discussions with Martin Vial (by phone) as tensions grew over merger plans. Internal emails show Nissan’s government affairs chief Hitoshi Kawaguchi relaying that METI officials feared the French government would press Ghosn at Renault’s upcoming general assembly to push an irreversible merger[49]. Kawaguchi wrote that he asked METI “not to be too aggressive” toward the French side while things were calming down[49]. Shortly after, on May 21, 2018, Kawaguchi sent Ghosn a draft memorandum of understanding from METI, discussed that day with Vial, which explicitly stated that “strengthening the alliance” must entail respecting Nissan’s independence and that decisions by Renault’s leaders would “never affect the freedom of decision-making of Nissan’s executives”**[50]. This draft MoU, essentially a pledge to preserve Nissan’s autonomy, confirms METI’s direct intervention in the alliance negotiations[51][52]. (Notably, the French ambassador in Tokyo even asked to postpone a second METI letter, leading to the May 7 Vial–METI call, as both governments maneuvered behind the scenes[53].)

METI’s History of Corporate Intervention (Toshiba Example)

Japan’s METI has a record of intervening in major corporate affairs. A striking example occurred in 2020–2021 with Toshiba. An independent probe found that Toshiba’s management colluded with METI to influence its 2020 shareholder meeting, aiming to block foreign activist investors from appointing new board members[54][55]. In one email, a Toshiba executive even wrote “We will ask METI to beat them up for a while,” referring to pressuring a foreign fund [56]. The report also alleged that (then Chief Cabinet Secretary, later PM) Yoshihide Suga encouraged this pressure on overseas shareholders[57]. Ultimately, Toshiba’s foreign investors were deterred from their board proposals, an outcome that an investigative report described as a result of undue government influence[54][55]. This Toshiba scandal illustrates METI’s interventionist policy in protecting Japanese corporate interests against foreign control, echoing what was feared in Nissan’s case.

Ghosn’s Alliance Vision, Netherlands Holding and Local Leadership

Carlos Ghosn’s plan to deepen the Alliance involved making their integration “irreversible.” In early 2018, Renault’s board explicitly mandated Ghosn to take “definitive action” to make the Alliance irreversible[58]. By this, Ghosn understood it to mean creating a holding company (likely in a neutral location like the Netherlands, where existing Alliance joint-ventures were based) to effectively merge the companies’ operations[58][59]. Such a restructuring would shift the center of strategic decision-making to the joint holding (in the Netherlands), thereby weakening the individual autonomy of Nissan, Renault, and Mitsubishi’s local leadership. Contemporary reports confirm that Renault’s 2018 plan envisioned bringing the automakers under one umbrella structure, a move seen by Nissan’s old guard as a de facto French takeover of Nissan[60][61]. Ghosn himself has noted that the Alliance’s governance had been run through Netherlands-based entities (like RNBV), which Japanese executives resented as it diluted their local control. Indeed, senior Nissan managers later admitted their “opposition to making the Alliance irreversible” was a prime motive behind the internal efforts to block Ghosn’s merger plans[62].

Hari Nada’s Career and Fears of Losing Influence

Hari Nada, a Malaysian-born lawyer, had devoted virtually his entire career to Nissan (joining the company in 1990)[63]. By 2017, he had risen to Senior Vice President and became head of the CEO Office, essentially serving as chief of staff first to Ghosn, then to Hiroto Saikawa after Saikawa became CEO in 2017[64][65]. Nada had been a trusted aide, working closely with Ghosn’s other right-hand man, Greg Kelly. However, he grew anxious about his role in the Alliance’s future. According to multiple accounts, Ghosn’s envisioned Alliance restructuring would have diminished Nada’s power or even eliminated his position. In fact, Ghosn had already decided that his Renault colleague Mouna Sepehri would head the unified Alliance CEO Office, leaving Nada without a comparable role[66][67]. Realizing he would “lose his power base and influence, if not his job,” Nada became personally invested in derailing Ghosn’s merger plans[66]. A New York Times investigation noted that by spring 2018, Nada wielded enormous clout at Nissan, controlling legal, compliance, security, and communications, yet he privately “worried that he would lose power in the alliance as others were promoted past him” under a new merged structure[68][69]. This intense fear of seeing his 30-year Nissan career sidelined was a key motivator in Nada turning against his longtime boss.

Nada’s Undermining of Ghosn’s Merger Plan

Facing Ghosn’s push for an irreversible merger, Hari Nada set out to undermine the plan from within. First, he floated the narrative that a Renault-Nissan merger was progressing regardless of Ghosn’s own wishes. In mid-February 2018, just after Renault’s board announced it wanted the Alliance made “irreversible,” Nada sent an urgent email to his team (including outside lawyers at Latham & Watkins and Nissan legal chief Ravinder Passi) stating he had concluded that “a train has been set in motion at Renault to completely integrate Nissan regardless of what Mr. Ghosn thinks…”[70]. By suggesting that the French side was driving a merger without Ghosn’s consent, Nada primed Nissan executives to resist what appeared to be an external threat. He urged discussing “implications and tactics as soon as possible,” essentially beginning an internal campaign to block the merger[70].

Subsequently, Nada and his allies portrayed Ghosn himself as fully committed to an inevitable merger, heightening fear among Nissan’s nationalists. Ghosn’s public pledge to make the alliance permanent gave them ammunition: senior Nissan managers were “alarmed by Ghosn’s pledge…to make the alliance…irreversible,” seeing it as proof that Ghosn would force a full integration[71]. Nada seized on this, warning colleagues that Ghosn was taking concrete steps toward a merger. Emails from 2018 (revealed later in court) show Nada and others strategizing that Ghosn’s ouster was needed “to forestall an expected move to a full merger with Renault”[72][73]. In other words, Nada fueled the perception internally that Ghosn’s “own plan” entailed an irrevocable Renault takeover of Nissan, and that only removing Ghosn could stop it[74][73]. This two-pronged narrative, that the merger was both externally imposed and Ghosn-driven, helped rally support within Nissan to oppose Ghosn’s next moves.

February 18, 2018, Nada’s Email to Latham & Watkins and Passi

On 18 February 2018, Hari Nada sent a critical email to key advisors that illuminates the coup plotters’ early mindset. As noted, days earlier Renault’s board had renewed Ghosn’s term on the condition he make the Alliance irreversible. In response, Nada emailed his close assistant (Kathryn Carlile), attorneys at Latham & Watkins, and Nissan’s global general counsel Ravinder Passi[75]. He wrote that after internal discussions with Nissan’s CFO (Joeseph Peter) and CEO (Saikawa), “I have concluded that a train has been set in motion at Renault to completely integrate Nissan regardless of what Mr. Ghosn thinks…”, and that he wanted to discuss the implications and possible counter-tactics immediately[76]. This email (later revealed during Greg Kelly’s trial) shows Nada sounding the alarm that the French side was moving inexorably toward a full merger. Essentially, he was notifying Nissan’s legal team that Renault’s decision was final and would result in Nissan’s absorption if they didn’t act fast[76]. This contemporaneous document strongly supports the claim that by mid-February 2018, Nada was actively strategizing to block an “irrevocable” Renault-Nissan merger, coordinating with both in-house and external lawyers.

April 26, 2018, Nada’s Warning Email to Saikawa

On April 26, 2018, Hari Nada emailed Nissan CEO Hiroto Saikawa with a stark personal warning about Ghosn’s intentions toward him. By this time, Nissan’s performance was lagging, and Ghosn had been pressuring executives to improve results. In the email, Nada cautioned Saikawa that Ghosn was highly sensitive to performance issues and hinted that Saikawa could “become [Ghosn’s] victim” if Nissan’s results didn’t satisfy him[77]. “He can create a major disruption and you may become a victim of it,” Nada wrote to Saikawa, advising him to be on guard[78]. This corresponds to the claim that Nada suggested Ghosn might sack or scapegoat Saikawa over performance. The Bloomberg-corroborated email trail confirms Nada explicitly told Saikawa that the merger push put them “at odds” and that Ghosn’s frustration with Nissan’s performance could endanger Saikawa’s position[79][78]. In essence, by late April 2018, Nada was encouraging Saikawa to view Ghosn as a personal threat, implicitly nudging Nissan’s CEO to align with the coup plotters for his own self-preservation.

May 15, 2018, Nada’s “Act Before It’s Too Late” Email

On May 15, 2018, Hari Nada sent another urgent email, this time stressing the need to move quickly against Ghosn’s merger agenda. In communications that month, Nada emphasized that Ghosn was now determined to make the Alliance “irreversible” by accelerating steps toward a merger, and that Nissan’s top managers had to “act quickly to disrupt his plans before it is too late.” Indeed, in one 2018 email, Nada implored Nissan government-affairs chief Hitoshi Kawaguchi that the company must stop Ghosn’s initiatives “before it’s too late.”[80]. He even invited Saikawa to discuss these concerns in person, indicating a conspiracy in motion. These emails (first reported by Bloomberg) paint a picture of a methodical campaign: Alarmed by Ghosn’s pledge…senior managers…discussed their concern… and Nada urged they halt Ghosn’s plans “before it’s too late.”[81][80]. In sum, by mid-May 2018 Nada was explicitly rallying colleagues to preemptively thwart Ghosn’s irreversible merger move, demonstrating that the plot against Ghosn was well underway months before his arrest.

Conspiracy with Imazu and Kawaguchi, Fear of Foreign Control

By summer 2018, Saikawa and Nada had solidified personal reasons to oust Ghosn, and they sought support from like-minded Nissan executives who harbored nationalist concerns. They enlisted Hidetoshi Imazu (Nissan’s statutory auditor) and Hitoshi Kawaguchi (SVP for government relations), both of whom deeply feared Nissan falling under foreign (French) control[82][83]. Emails and later testimony confirm that these four men were secretly working in concert. Kawaguchi admitted under oath during Greg Kelly’s trial that he, Nada and Imazu conspired “to stop the Renault merger and to remove Ghosn from management,” operating behind Ghosn’s back[83]. Imazu and Kawaguchi in particular, sometimes dubbed Nissan’s “old guard”, believed the French state (Renault’s biggest shareholder) intended to “take control of Nissan,” and that despite Ghosn’s reassurances, he would ultimately be unable or unwilling to prevent a French takeover[82]. In their eyes, Ghosn’s merger plan equated to Nissan’s loss of independence, which they found unacceptable. Thus, these nationalist-leaning executives joined forces with Saikawa and Nada. Internal communications from 2018 characterize Imazu and Kawaguchi as key coup plotters: they launched secret investigations and coordinated with Japanese authorities, specifically to block “a full Renault-Nissan merger” and keep Nissan out of foreign hands[83][84]. Their participation shows the plot was driven not only by personal agendas but by a broader xenophobic sentiment within Nissan’s leadership.

Role of METI and Recruitment of Masakazu Toyoda

The conspirators recognized that ousting Ghosn would be impossible without support from the Japanese government, particularly METI. To secure Tokyo’s backing, they brought in Masakazu Toyoda, a heavyweight ex-bureaucrat, as an inside ally. Toyoda is a former METI official (he served as METI’s Vice-Minister for International Affairs in 2007)[85], effectively a deputy minister role. In early 2018, Toyoda was seeking a post-retirement corporate role, and Nissan’s Kawaguchi saw an opportunity. Toyoda was hired by Nissan in February 2018 through an introduction by Kawaguchi[86]. This was a strategic move: as one Ghosn associate later recounted, METI minister Hiroshige Seko personally “imposed in June the entry of a METI member, Masakazu Toyoda, into Nissan.”[88]. Indeed, at Nissan’s June 2018 shareholder meeting, Toyoda was officially appointed to the board as an outside director, explicitly representing Japanese government interests on the inside[89][90].

By co-opting Toyoda, the coup plotters ensured METI’s tacit support. Toyoda became a conduit to METI’s leadership; his mere presence on the board signaled that the Japanese government was backing Nissan’s autonomy. In essence, METI was now enlisted in the conspiracy. (Notably, around the same time, Minister Seko was closely following the alliance discussions and even intervened by letters and calls, as seen above.) Toyoda’s recruitment underscores that Ghosn’s removal was not just an internal Nissan power struggle, but had government involvement. Nissan’s move to hire a high-ranking METI veteran in the midst of merger tensions was no coincidence, it was an effort to rally Japan Inc.’s support in what became the campaign to oust Ghosn[91][86].

Kawaguchi’s Testimony, Invoking Suga’s Influence

During court testimony (in the trial of Greg Kelly in Tokyo), Hitoshi Kawaguchi revealed just how far Nissan’s coup plotters reached into Japan’s political sphere. Kawaguchi testified that he intended to involve the “right-hand man” of Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga to help “protect Nissan” from a foreign takeover threat. In practical terms, Kawaguchi, who had been Nissan’s top government liaison, had direct connections in the Prime Minister’s office and was prepared to use them[83]. In fact, he was known as the link between Nissan and both PM Shinzo Abe and Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga (who became PM in 2020)[92]. This corroborates the idea that Kawaguchi sought support from Suga’s circle.

Kawaguchi’s in-court admissions were striking: he openly acknowledged a “conspiracy” along with Nada and Imazu to oust Ghosn and stop the Renault merger[83]. He described rallying high-level political backing to shield Nissan, essentially confirming that he brought in Japan’s political “big guns” to the fight. While he didn’t name Suga’s aide explicitly in the publicly reported testimony, Kawaguchi’s role as government affairs chief meant he was in contact with senior officials. (Recall Saikawa’s email in May 2018 noting that Abe and Suga gave “very solid but more discreet” support to Nissan’s stance[93], indicating the government’s involvement behind closed doors.) In short, Kawaguchi leveraged his strong ties to the Abe–Suga administration to ensure the Japanese government would side with Nissan’s management against Ghosn. His testimony underscores that the highest echelons of Japan’s government were at least informally aligned with the effort to block a foreign-dominated merger and remove Ghosn, whom they viewed as too sympathetic to French interests[83].

Masakazu Toyoda’s Background and Post-Coup Power

Masakazu Toyoda brought formidable government experience to Nissan’s board. He had spent decades in public service, primarily at METI, and rose to be Vice-Minister for International Affairs (2007–2008), essentially METI’s top official for external economic policy[85]. (He also held posts like Trade Policy Bureau chief and even a Cabinet Secretariat role on space policy[94].) Toyoda’s insider knowledge of government made him an ideal ally for Nissan’s coup plotters. As noted, Kawaguchi recruited Toyoda in Feb 2018, and he was officially elected as an outside director in June 2018[86][89]. A Nissan insider later described Toyoda as the “brains” behind the operation to depose Ghosn[86][89].

After the conspiracy succeeded with Ghosn’s arrest in November 2018, Toyoda emerged as arguably the most powerful man at Nissan. In 2019, Nissan revamped its governance and Toyoda was made chairman of the Board Nomination Committee, giving him decisive influence over top executive appointments[95]. He also sat on the Audit Committee and the new Governance Committee (which oversaw corporate governance reforms)[96]. Essentially, Toyoda became a kingmaker at Nissan: he led the committee that selects Nissan’s leadership and held sway in auditing and compliance oversight[97][95]. This concentration of authority came directly as a result of the post-Ghosn power vacuum. It’s telling that Toyoda, as a former METI official, took charge of “improving governance” at Nissan after having helped secretly plan Ghosn’s ouster[98]. In sum, Toyoda’s journey, from being inserted into Nissan by METI contacts, to helping orchestrate Ghosn’s downfall, to leading Nissan’s board committees, is well documented in both investigative reporting and Nissan’s own disclosures. It validates the claim that he was rewarded with immense influence following the coup[98][89].

Kawaguchi’s Connections to Abe and Suga

Hitoshi Kawaguchi’s value to the Nissan coup group lay in his deep political connections. As Nissan’s longtime head of government affairs, Kawaguchi had cultivated strong ties in Nagatacho (Japan’s political center). Reports confirm that he had “links to both Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his successor Yoshihide Suga.”[92] In fact, Kawaguchi served as Nissan’s point-man with the Japanese government, a role in which he frequently interfaced with top officials in the Abe administration. This meant that when Nissan’s nationalist faction moved against Ghosn, Kawaguchi could readily engage supportive figures in the government.

We see this in action in 2018: Kawaguchi communicated Nissan’s concerns to METI (as noted) and even hinted at involving Suga. Later, in trial testimony, he acknowledged contacting the government to help “protect Nissan”[83]. It’s widely believed that Kawaguchi’s clout helped ensure a sympathetic ear in Tokyo for the ouster of Ghosn. (Notably, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga was reportedly kept informed; one independent inquiry found Suga even encouraged tough measures in the Toshiba case, reflecting how such officials support corporate interests[57].)

Thus, Kawaguchi’s strong connections with Abe and Suga are not only asserted by Ghosn’s defense but also supported by Nissan insiders and media reports. Asia Times describes Kawaguchi as “the link” to the Abe/Suga administrations[92]. This political backing adds broader confirmation to the notion that the campaign against Ghosn was state-sanctioned or at least state-supported. In summary, Kawaguchi leveraged his high-level political network to facilitate the coup, ensuring that Nissan’s actions would not face government pushback, indeed, they had tacit approval from Japan’s top leaders[83].

June 26, 2018, Toyoda’s Appointment Approved

On June 26, 2018, Nissan’s shareholders formally approved Masakazu Toyoda’s appointment to the board as an independent director (alongside another new outside director, Keiko Ihara)[99]. This vote, at Nissan’s 119th Annual General Meeting in Yokohama, ratified what had been set in motion months prior, installing a METI-endorsed figure at the highest level of Nissan’s governance. Nissan’s official filings and annual report for 2018 confirm Toyoda’s board membership beginning June 2018[100]. As noted, Toyoda joined the board as an outside director in June 2018[89], and he was immediately positioned to play a leading role in Nissan’s committees. Shareholder approval was a mere formality given Nissan’s recommendations; the significance lies in the timing. Toyoda’s entry came just as the anti-Ghosn faction was laying plans (April–May 2018) to oust Ghosn. By late June, with Toyoda in place, the conspirators had both internal and external (government) reinforcement on the board. A member of “Team Japan” was now officially in the boardroom. This fact is well-documented by both the company (in shareholder notices) and the press. For example, Asia Times notes Toyoda “joined the board as an outside director in June 2018” and was later regarded by Ghosn as a chief architect of the coup[89]. The June 2018 AGM approval of Toyoda thus provides concrete, dated evidence aligning with the claim. It underscores how early the groundwork for the coup was laid, and it demonstrates that by mid-2018 the Japanese state’s interests (via Toyoda) had been formally embedded in Nissan’s board[88][89].

Early Stages of the Coup (June 2018)

On June 16, 2018, the day after Renault’s board renewed Carlos Ghosn’s contract, Nissan’s lead auditor Hidetoshi Imazu secretly went to Tokyo prosecutors with an investigative dossier on Ghosn, instead of reporting to Nissan’s board[101]. At the time, none of the alliance boards (Nissan, Renault, Mitsubishi) were aware of this plan[101]. The goal of Imazu and fellow plotters (including legal chief Hari Nada and others) was to swiftly oust Ghosn via criminal arrest and subsequent defamation campaigns (even extending to France) to ruin his reputation[102][103]. Notably, Tokyo prosecutors initially told Imazu that the evidence in June “was not enough”, they needed more incriminating material before pursuing a case, and at that point had nothing implicating director Greg Kelly[104]. In other words, the first secret approach did not justify arrest, prompting the conspirators to dig further.

Building a Case Over the Next Five Months

Over the following five months (summer–fall 2018), Nissan’s coup plotters worked intensively (and in strict secrecy) to compile a case against Ghosn. Multiple sources later revealed that Nissan spent over $200 million on legal fees, investigative work, and even a team of dozens of translators in the six-month period surrounding Ghosn’s November 2018 arrest[105]. (Bloomberg likewise reported Nissan spent “more than $200 million investigating Ghosn”[106].) During this time, Hari Nada and Nissan manager Toshiaki (Takeshi) Onuma negotiated Japan’s newly introduced plea bargains to avoid their own prosecution. In exchange for immunity, both agreed to cooperate and provide evidence against Ghosn[107][108]. Nada began plea talks by September 2018, formalizing an immunity deal by October 31, 2018, while Onuma signed a similar cooperation agreement by November 1, 2018[109][110]. Armed with these deals, Nada became a key informant, even fabricating evidence in some instances (for example, he lured Greg Kelly to Japan under false pretenses)[111]. Onuma, who had handled Ghosn’s executive pay schemes, later testified in court that there was both “decided paid compensation for Mr. Ghosn but also unpaid compensation,” confirming the arrangement to defer Ghosn’s income without public disclosure[112]. (Onuma’s testimony about how they planned to avoid disclosure, essentially the compensation gap at the heart of the charges, was a centerpiece of the trial[113][112].)

Hari Nada’s role in these months was especially pivotal. As head of the CEO’s office and a trained lawyer, he had been involved in Ghosn’s personal affairs, for example, he was one of three administrators of Nissan’s Dutch subsidiary Zi-A Capital B.V., which purchased Ghosn’s homes (such as a $8.8 million Beirut house in 2012, with $6 million in renovations)[114]. Nada was thus intimately familiar with Ghosn’s company-funded residences in Beirut, Paris, Rio and elsewhere[115]. He had also earlier helped devise proposals to retain and compensate Ghosn post-retirement (including non-compete and advisory fee arrangements)[116]. By 2018, Nada grew “nervous” that these sizable retirement payment plans (over $80 million in deferred pay) could be seen as improper; fearing personal liability, he turned on Ghosn and “spilled the beans” to prosecutors[117]. In late October 2018, Nada was openly boasting to Nissan colleagues that Ghosn’s arrest was imminent[118]. He even orchestrated pre-emptive moves abroad: on October 23, 2018, Nada flew to Rio de Janeiro, and on October 24 to Beirut, reportedly to prepare for seizing Ghosn’s files and properties in those cities[119]. (These trips went largely unnoticed at the time, as he used a Nissan corporate jet[119].)

The November 19, 2018 Arrest and Global Raids

On November 19, 2018, Carlos Ghosn and Greg Kelly were arrested in Tokyo upon arrival. That same day, coordinated raids took place on Ghosn-related premises in four countries, Beirut, Paris, Amsterdam, and Rio, led by teams associated with Nissan. An internal Nissan task force (code-named “Kali-10”) had prepared these raids in advance[120][121]. In Beirut, for example, Nissan dispatched two senior lawyers from headquarters, Fabien Lesort and Jérôme (Jamie) Dawson, to join Nissan’s regional security chief Daniel Bernabé[122]. Nissan’s outside counsel Latham & Watkins sent Marc Makary from its Dubai office to participate[122]. (Other members of the five-person Beirut team included a third Nissan lawyer, and in Rio de Janeiro a compliance executive Salvador Dahan handled the operation[122][123].) These individuals gained access to a local Nissan-affiliated office in Beirut under false pretenses, the local manager was told to grant Nissan “unrestricted access,” ostensibly to remove Nissan property[124][125]. Once inside, the team seized office files, a laptop computer and a mobile device, asserting they were Nissan-owned equipment[125]. According to the Lebanese office manager’s later affidavit, the team exceeded their permission: they also took a hard drive belonging to Ghosn’s late attorney, Fadi Gebran, and other personal archives without her consent or any warrant[126][127]. That hard drive contained “many thousands” of confidential legal documents and emails, essentially Ghosn’s and Gebran’s privileged legal files, which were not Nissan’s property[128]. Ghosn’s camp alleges the raid team then traveled in an armed convoy to Ghosn’s residence in Beirut and pressured their way in (the locks had not been changed), removing personal papers, another computer and a phone[129]. All devices and data taken in Lebanon were shipped to Japan, where prosecutors later cited them as evidence. In fact, a particular laptop obtained in Lebanon proved instrumental: it was used by a 44-year-old assistant (Amal Rizkallah Abou-Jaoude) who worked for Ghosn’s lawyer Gebran, and it contained detailed information on Ghosn’s financial transactions[130][131]. People familiar with the investigation noted that without this Lebanese laptop, Nissan and Japanese prosecutors might have struggled to substantiate some charges[130][132]. (Ghosn’s lawyers have since filed a criminal complaint in Lebanon over these acts; that case remains open[133].)

Meanwhile in Japan, a crucial email from Hari Nada on November 18, 2018 (the day prior) had revealed the plotters’ intention for what comes after Ghosn’s downfall. In that email to CEO Hiroto Saikawa, later disclosed in court, Nada wrote that Ghosn’s “wrongdoing and removal” represents a fundamental change in the Alliance, and thus a new Alliance governance must be found[134]. In other words, Ghosn’s ouster was seen as the chance to overhaul the Renault–Nissan structure in Nissan’s favor. Indeed, Nada’s November 18 memo argued that Ghosn’s fall justified renegotiating the balance of power in the Alliance[134]. (It was later evident this was the coup’s true motive: preventing Renault’s integration plans and restoring Nissan’s autonomy[135].)

Legal Aftermath: Evidence Handling and Charges

The aftermath of Ghosn’s arrest saw both legal action and alleged prosecutorial misconduct. On October 24, 2019, The New York Times reported disturbing accusations that Tokyo prosecutors had tampered with or deleted evidence at Nissan’s request[136]. According to the report (as relayed in court filings), prosecutors limited Ghosn’s defense team to only “viewing” certain evidence and even deleted electronic data that Nissan asked to keep secret, declaring thousands of files “off-limits” because Nissan deemed them too sensitive[136]. This raised further questions about collusion between Nissan and the authorities to secure a conviction at any cost.

On the corporate side, Nissan itself took swift action after the arrest. On November 22, 2018, Nissan’s board unanimously voted to remove Carlos Ghosn as Chairman and to dismiss Greg Kelly from his director position[137]. (Mitsubishi Motors’ board did the same shortly thereafter, on Nov 26, 2018, ousting Ghosn from their chairmanship as well[138].) Formal charges followed: on December 10, 2018, Japanese prosecutors issued the first indictments against Ghosn and Kelly for underreporting Ghosn’s deferred compensation in Nissan’s securities filings, a violation of financial laws[139]. (That initial indictment covered roughly ¥5 billion of income from 2010–2014 that was allegedly concealed; additional counts would be added later to extend through 2017[140][141].) Nissan as a company was indicted too and pleaded guilty to its role in the misreporting on the same day[142].

Nissan’s campaign against Ghosn proved extraordinarily costly. By mid-2019, Nissan’s internal legal bills had exploded, an estimated $200 million was spent in just the first six months after Ghosn’s arrest on attorneys, investigators, and translators working around the clock on the case[105]. Not only that, one insider estimates the figure grew to $300–$400 million after accounting for later expenses, including severance packages and nondisclosure agreements essentially “buying the silence” of former employees who were dismissed in the purge[143]. (Each dollar spent on this saga was “a dollar not spent on product development,” as observers grimly noted[144].) Nissan’s own stock took a hit: in early 2019 a U.S. shareholder class-action suit was filed in Tennessee alleging that Nissan’s concealment of Ghosn’s pay issues (and the ensuing scandal) damaged investors[145].

Fallout: Corporate Losses and Management Purge

By all accounts, the coup against Ghosn inflicted massive financial harm on the carmakers involved. Carlos Ghosn himself has pointed out that in the two years following his ouster, the combined market capitalization and business losses of Nissan, Renault, and Mitsubishi ballooned to roughly $40 billion[146]. This staggering figure includes lost shareholder value and declining profits across the three Alliance companies. (“There was no bank robbery,” Ghosn quipped, “but there is bankruptcy”, a collapse of a once-successful alliance system, leading to about $40 billion in losses for Nissan, Renault and Mitsubishi by 2020[146].) In Ghosn’s view, the blame lies squarely with the executives who orchestrated the coup and the board members who rubber-stamped it[147][148]. Indeed, Nissan’s performance and stock price remained far below pre-coup levels for years, and Renault’s share price also stagnated, a “disastrous” outcome that Ghosn argues eclipses any accusations about his compensation[149][150].

Nissan also underwent a sweeping management purge in the aftermath. Virtually every executive seen as close to Ghosn or not aligned with the coup plotters was pushed out of the company in 2019–2020[151][152]. This exodus included some of Nissan’s top talent:
– José Muñoz, Nissan’s Chief Performance Officer and a Ghosn ally, resigned in early 2019 (he later joined Hyundai)[153][154].
– Arun Bajaj, head of HR (and key in Ghosn’s retention plans), was forced out and later followed Muñoz to Hyundai[154].
– Vincent Cobée, product strategy chief, left for PSA Group (Peugeot Citroën)[154].
– Trevor Mann, former COO of Mitsubishi (and ex-Nissan manufacturing chief), was dismissed in the post-Ghosn shakeup[154].
– Tony Thomas, Chief Information Officer, departed Nissan[155].
– Jo Peter, Chief Financial Officer, with decades at Nissan/GM, was let go in 2019[155].
– Ravinder Passi, Global General Counsel, who had objected to Nada’s role in the probe, was sidelined and eventually left Nissan[155].
– José Valls, Chairman of Nissan North America, resigned in 2019 amid the turmoil[155].

In total, an estimated 30–40 senior managers were ousted or resigned, a “talent drain” that even Nissan’s own new leaders acknowledged, as many experienced executives were replaced by outsiders or much more junior staff[156][157]. Ghosn has noted that the alliance lost many of its best people and was thrown into “gridlock” by this management disruption[158][159]. (Several expelled executives have since taken high-profile jobs elsewhere, for instance, Thierry Bolloré went on to lead Jaguar Land Rover, and Jun Seki left Nissan to become CEO of Nidec Corp.[160][161].) This house-cleaning mainly spared those insiders who had participated in or supported the coup, reinforcing Ghosn’s charge that it was a politically motivated purge rather than a genuine compliance effort[148][162].

Conspiracy and Internal Investigation Against Carlos Ghosn (2018–2020)

Early 2018: Plans to Oust Ghosn Emerge

In early 2018, a small group of Nissan insiders began strategizing to remove Chairman Carlos Ghosn from power. According to later court testimony and internal emails, their initial aim was to pressure Ghosn to resign voluntarily by spring 2018[169]. Hari Nada, a Nissan vice president and onetime close aide to Ghosn, was at the center of these discussions. In mid-2018, Nada emailed Nissan government-affairs chief Hitoshi Kawaguchi that Nissan should “neutralise [Ghosn’s] initiatives before it’s too late”[169], reflecting fears that Ghosn’s plans for deeper Renault-Nissan integration would diminish Nissan’s autonomy.

By June 2018, the plotters concluded that Nissan’s board (largely loyal to Ghosn) would not act against him internally. The conspirators therefore shifted strategy, deciding their “only option” was to take evidence to Japanese prosecutors and trigger Ghosn’s removal externally[170]. (Indeed, former Nissan auditor Hidetoshi Imazu later testified he bypassed the board and went straight to Tokyo prosecutors with his concerns[170].) Ghosn has asserted that this coup was likely in motion as far back as February 2018[171]. In other words, well before any public hint of misconduct, a methodical campaign was underway inside Nissan to oust him[172][173].

May 2018: A “Roadmap” for Removal

Determined to get rid of Ghosn “for any reason,” the Nissan conspirators even drew up an internal roadmap of scenarios for removing him. According to reports, an outline dated May 30, 2018 listed possible strategies, and this confidential “roadmap” was later shown on Japanese TV, highlighting how deliberate the scheme had been. The plan contemplated either using legal grounds to force Ghosn out, or leveraging Nissan’s corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, the scenarios included:

Legal Incapacity or Guardianship: Have Ghosn declared mentally or physically unfit to serve, by appointing a guardian for incapacity.

Civil Violations: Find a definitive civil violation (such as breaches of Japan’s Companies Act, failures to disclose executive remuneration, or other corporate compliance breaches) resulting in a final judgment against Ghosn. Any such judgment could be used as cause for removal[174].

Criminal Charges: Ensure Ghosn faced a final criminal conviction, ideally with imprisonment, under any Japanese law, which would clearly disqualify him from leadership[174]. (Notably, the plotters were prepared to flag any possible misconduct, even unrelated to Nissan’s core business, that could lead to Ghosn’s prosecution and disgrace.)

Personal Bankruptcy: Initiate bankruptcy proceedings against Ghosn in court, which could tarnish his standing and justify termination.

Alternatively, if legal tactics failed, the roadmap outlined corporate mechanisms to oust Ghosn: having Nissan’s board of directors dismiss him by resolution, or convening an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting to remove him. In essence, no stone would be left unturned. Nissan’s CEO at the time, Hiroto Saikawa, later indeed ordered an internal probe of Ghosn’s compensation and expenses to hunt for any actionable wrongdoing[175]. This illustrates how the company was actively looking for a pretext to eject Ghosn through “legitimate” means.

Summer Fall 2018: Covert Tactics, Email Hacking

As the plan advanced, Hari Nada took extraordinary steps to gather evidence and build a case. Between July and October 2018, Nada covertly hired an independent IT security firm under the guise of conducting an “ethical hacking” or network penetration test for Nissan[176][177]. In reality, one of the primary objectives he gave the firm was to gain access to Ghosn’s Nissan email accounts[178]. The French cybersecurity firm (identified as Wavestone) successfully breached Nissan’s network, infiltrated the Microsoft Exchange email server, and proved it could copy Ghosn’s entire mailbox[177]. This operation was ostensibly to “assess system security,” but in truth it furnished Nada with Ghosn’s private communications.

Crucially, Hari Nada kept this email hack secret from almost everyone at Nissan[179]. He did not inform CEO Saikawa, the IT department, or compliance officers in advance. Nissan’s IT staff only learned of the intrusion after detecting unusual network activity, essentially catching the penetration test in progress[179]. By then, Wavestone had accessed sensitive areas of Nissan’s network (including confidential design and production files) and demonstrated total access to Ghosn’s email[177]. The timing was no coincidence: Nada’s cooperation with prosecutors began around the same period[180], raising suspicions that data from Ghosn’s emails may have been exfiltrated and handed to authorities. (Ghosn later called the case against him a “campaign of lies,” questioning whether evidence was planted or misused during these covert operations[181].)

Latham and Watkins’ Contested Investigation

In parallel, Nissan’s management enlisted external lawyers to legitimize the ouster. In mid-2018, the global law firm Latham & Watkins LLP was brought in to conduct an “independent” internal investigation focusing on Ghosn[174]. Ironically, Latham & Watkins had for years advised Nissan (and Ghosn) on how to structure executive pay, including the very compensation agreements now under scrutiny[182]. Nevertheless, once Japanese authorities began probing Ghosn’s pay in 2018, Nissan directed Latham to investigate Ghosn’s alleged misconduct and find any material evidence of wrongdoing[174].

This decision raised serious conflict-of-interest concerns. Nissan’s own general counsel, Ravinder Passi, protested that having Latham investigate Ghosn’s pay was problematic, given the firm had helped design those pay schemes in the first place[183]. “How is this going to appear when you’ve got the same lawyers investigating… their own work?” Passi later recalled thinking[183]. He feared Latham’s dual role — architect of Ghosn’s compensation and now investigator of it — meant the probe could never be truly independent[183]. Nonetheless, Nissan and Latham pressed ahead, insisting no conflict existed and that the inquiry was thorough and appropriate[184]. (Latham’s findings would later dovetail with the prosecutors’ case, effectively justifying Nissan’s actions[184].)

September 2018: An Internal Task Force Forms

As the target date for action drew closer, Nissan’s top brass formed a small task force to handle the impending scandal. On September 17, 2018, Hari Nada met with Christina Murray (Nissan’s head of compliance and internal audit) and Ravinder Passi (global general counsel) to inform them that “financial misconduct” allegations against Ghosn were on the horizon. He essentially put them on alert that an investigation would be needed. The very next month, in October 2018, CEO Hiroto Saikawa formally instructed Murray to lead an internal investigation into potential disclosure and compensation violations by Ghosn and Nissan director Greg Kelly[175].

Murray assembled a trusted team for this confidential probe. She included Manabu Sakane, a vice president for corporate governance (though an engineer by background, with little governance experience)[175], as well as Passi and herself. This trio was deliberately small and worked with great secrecy. Notably, a lawyer from Latham & Watkins was assigned to “assist” Murray’s team on the ground in Tokyo[185]. (Unbeknownst to Murray’s group, that same Latham lawyer and Hari Nada were coordinating closely on the broader coup plans behind the scenes[185].)

“War Room” on the 21st Floor

The Ghosn investigation team operated out of a secure room deep inside Nissan’s Yokohama headquarters. They set up a kind of “war room” on the 21st floor of the HQ, near the CEO Office and, importantly, adjacent to the offices of Hari Nada and Takeshi Onuma (another conspirator in Ghosn’s secretariat)[186]. The location was no accident: the 21st floor was controlled by top executives, ensuring privacy. In fact, the entire scheme to remove Ghosn “emanated from Nissan’s CEO office on the 21st floor,” as later investigative reports noted[186]. By choosing a room right under the noses of Nada and Onuma, the task force could be closely monitored, or subtly influenced, by those driving the agenda.

For several weeks, Murray, Passi, Sakane (and their Latham advisor) combed through emails, financial records, and expense reports tied to Ghosn and Kelly. The atmosphere was tense and cloak-and-dagger. Even as this official task force did its work, Hari Nada was boasting privately that Ghosn would be arrested and removed. In late October 2018, Nada candidly told Murray and Passi about his plan to involve the Tokyo Public Prosecutors’ Office, speaking almost gleefully about the prospect of Ghosn being taken into custody[187]. (Indeed, Nada had struck a secret immunity deal with prosecutors by the end of October 2018[187], even as the internal team was still investigating, a stark conflict that he did not share with them.)

November 2018: The Trap is Sprung

On November 19, 2018, Carlos Ghosn and Greg Kelly were suddenly arrested upon landing in Tokyo, shocking the automotive world. It later emerged that Hari Nada, Imazu, Kawaguchi and other insiders had handed over internal Nissan information to prosecutors in advance, without board approval[188][189]. Simultaneously, Nissan’s Latham & Watkins lawyers coordinated raids on Ghosn’s residences abroad (in Beirut, Rio, Paris, etc.) to seize documents and devices[190], actions taken without local warrants, raising legal and ethical questions. The careful plan laid over months had succeeded in one sense: Ghosn was ousted and vilified, accused of financial misconduct.

However, this was far from the end of the saga. What followed was a power struggle within Nissan over how far to probe wrongdoing, and whether to expose the full truth (including the conspirators’ own misdeeds) or only Ghosn’s. That struggle came to a head in 2019.

Mid-2019: Uncovering Other Misconduct

In the wake of Ghosn’s arrest, Nissan’s board sought to show it was cleaning house. The company commissioned Anderson, Mori & Tomotsune, a respected outside law firm, to perform an internal audit of executive compensation practices. This probe, launched in June 2019, ran parallel to the ongoing criminal case. By August 2019, Anderson Mori delivered a bombshell report: it found that multiple Nissan executives (not just Ghosn) had improperly enriched themselves via stock-linked bonus schemes[191][192].

Most prominently, Nissan CEO Hiroto Saikawa himself had received a windfall of ¥47 million (nearly $430,000 USD) by backdating the vesting of share appreciation rights, an unauthorized bonus exposed by the audit[191]. Similarly, Hari Nada was found to have obtained ¥30 million (over $270,000 USD) through irregular stock option grants[191]. In total, eight Nissan executives were identified for receiving compensation in violation of company rules[192]. This group included: former HR chief Arun Bajaj; internal auditor Hidetoshi Imazu (the very whistleblower who helped instigate Ghosn’s takedown); former co-Chairman Itaru Koeda; ex-COO Toshiyuki Shiga; and several others[192]. In short, the “integrity” of Nissan’s leadership was called into question, it appeared many had “dirt on their hands,” not just Ghosn[193].

These findings validated concerns that Ghosn’s case was a selective prosecution. As Carlos Ghosn would later point out, none of the Japanese executives faced legal consequences comparable to his, despite their own infractions[193][194]. This put Nissan’s board in a precarious position: How to handle the evidence of broader misconduct? Christina Murray’s compliance team was about to address exactly that.

August 2019: Murray’s 175-Page Report

Throughout 2019, Christina Murray’s task force continued its internal inquiry, expanding beyond just Ghosn’s pay to examine the wider pattern of executive misconduct. By late summer, with Anderson Mori’s audit completed, Murray worked to compile a comprehensive report of all findings. She, along with the Latham lawyers assisting her, produced a draft report spanning 173–175 pages[195][196]. This report detailed not only the allegations against Ghosn and Kelly, but also the improprieties of other executives (like Saikawa and Nada) and the “enablers” within Nissan’s ranks who had facilitated rule-bending over the years[197][198].

Murray planned to present this extensive report to Nissan’s Audit Committee on September 4, 2019, and then to the full Board of Directors on September 9, 2019[199]. In the last week of August, she gave a copy to Ravinder Passi for review and even met with certain board members to prepare them for what it would contain[199]. All signs indicated Nissan was finally going to hear the full truth, including uncomfortable facts about the very executives who had engineered Ghosn’s downfall.

Instead, what happened next underscored the depth of the cover-up. On August 28, 2019, just days before the scheduled presentation, Audit Committee chairman Masakazu (Motoo) Nagai intervened decisively. After Murray dutifully delivered hard copies of her report (and the Anderson Mori audit report) to him, Nagai ordered her to “suspend all investigations” immediately[200][201]. He claimed that Murray herself had developed a “conflict of interest,” and thus could no longer continue. (What conflict? No explanation was given[201].) The instruction was effectively to stop digging into Nada or others any further. Murray, stunned, later told colleagues she felt this was a deliberate effort to undermine her work[202].

August September 2019: Resignations and Suppression

Faced with this blatant shutdown of her investigation, Christina Murray resigned in protest. On August 30, 2019, the highly respected compliance chief submitted her resignation letter and was effectively gone from Nissan as of September 9[203]. She never got to present her 175-page report to the Audit Committee or the board[204]. In fact, Nissan’s security personnel confiscated the report files from her office almost immediately after her departure[205][206]. (Murray’s team had been so thorough that some insiders feared the report might expose the full conspiracy, giving Nissan’s leadership motive to bury it.) Murray later indicated she had not planned to leave at all, she had just been promoted in April 2019, but Nagai’s abrupt order made it impossible for her to fulfill her duty[207]. She left Japan entirely and, by 2020, took a new compliance job in the US.

The purge did not stop with her. Ravinder Passi, who had supported Murray and raised red flags about conflicts of interest, was the next to be dealt with. On September 12, 2019, Nissan (now under interim management, as Saikawa was about to step down) removed Passi from his position as global legal counsel[208]. Hiroto Saikawa, in one of his final acts as CEO, sent Passi a letter on that date informing him he was being replaced and would no longer be involved in the Ghosn-related investigations[208]. A Nissan insider, Kathryn Carlile (considered loyal to Hari Nada), was installed in Passi’s role. The message was clear: those who dug too deep or challenged the narrative were not welcome. By mid-September 2019, the internal fact-finding had been effectively muzzled. Nissan’s public statements about the scandal continued to pin all blame on Ghosn and Kelly, and notably promised not to pursue any other executives for related misconduct[209]. This was the whitewashed outcome that the coup plotters had orchestrated.

(Indeed, at a September 2019 board meeting, the Audit Committee presented only a brief six-page summary of Murray’s work, omitting any mention of conflict of interest issues, the Anderson Mori findings of executive overpayments, or the fact that Hari Nada himself had benefited from the improper stock bonus scheme[210][197]. The board swiftly moved to demand Saikawa’s resignation over the ¥47 million bonus, making him a scapegoat, while ignoring the culpability of others like Nada[211][194].)

May 2020: Retaliation Against the Whistleblower

Having been sidelined, Ravinder Passi remained nominally a Nissan employee into 2020, but his relationship with the company kept deteriorating. He filed a whistleblower complaint in the UK, alleging he was pushed out for calling attention to wrongdoing[212][213]. Nissan’s response was aggressive. In what Passi later described as an act of harassment, Nissan CEO Makoto Uchida authorized a raid on Passi’s home in Japan in late May 2020[214]. On May 28, 2020, a team of people with a court order arrived at Passi’s Tokyo residence to seize his company-issued laptop and mobile phone, devices that likely contained evidence of communications related to the case[214]. Passi’s wife and children were present and shaken by the unannounced search[214]. Nissan claimed this was a legal measure to secure its confidential information, but to Passi and others it looked like retaliation and intimidation.

Shortly afterward, Passi’s overseas assignment was canceled and he was terminated from Nissan altogether (officially for “misconduct,” though he argues it was because of his whistleblowing)[215][216]. This episode underscored Nissan’s hard-line stance: even after Ghosn had fled Japan (he dramatically escaped in December 2019), the company pursued those perceived as aligning with him or against Nissan’s narrative. As one observer noted, Nissan under Uchida seemed intent on treating anything related to Ghosn as “the crime of the century” and was not backing down[217].

The evidence of a concerted plan, the “roadmap” of removal scenarios, the clandestine handover of Nissan files to prosecutors, the conflicts involving Latham & Watkins, and the internal reports that were suppressed, suggests a deliberate effort to engineer a downfall rather than let justice take its unbiased course.